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ABSTRACT
Robots need models of human behavior for both inferring human
goals and preferences, and predicting what people will do. A com-
mon model is the Boltzmann noisily-rational decision model, which
assumes people approximately optimize a reward function and
choose trajectories in proportion to their exponentiated reward.
While this model has been successful in a variety of robotics do-
mains, its roots lie in econometrics, and in modeling decisions
among different discrete options, each with its own utility or re-
ward. In contrast, human trajectories lie in a continuous space, with
continuous-valued features that influence the reward function. We
propose that it is time to rethink the Boltzmann model, and design
it from the ground up to operate over such trajectory spaces. We
introduce a model that explicitly accounts for distances between
trajectories, rather than only their rewards. Rather than each trajec-
tory affecting the decision independently, similar trajectories now
affect the decision together. We start by showing that our model
better explains human behavior in a user study.We then analyze the
implications this has for robot inference, first in toy environments
where we have ground truth and find more accurate inference, and
finally for a 7DOF robot arm learning from user demonstrations.
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Figure 1: (Top) Contrary to Boltzmann, when adding more
options to the right, LESS (right) does not drastically reduce
the probability of selecting the left option. (Bottom)We test
LESS on learning from user demonstrations for a 7DOF arm.
1 INTRODUCTION
What we do depends on our intent – our goals and our preferences.
When robots collaborate with us, they need to be able to observe
our behavior and infer our intent from it, so that they can help
us achieve it. They also need to anticipate or predict our future
behavior given what they have inferred, so that they can seamlessly
coordinate their behavior with ours. Both inference and prediction
thus require a model of human behavior conditioned on intent.
A very popular such model is Boltzmann rationality [2, 22]. It
formalizes intent via a reward function, and models the human
as selecting trajectories in proportion to their (exponentiated) re-
ward. Boltzmann rationality has seen great successes in a variety
of robotic domains, from mobile robots [9, 12, 18, 21, 27] to au-
tonomous cars [11, 25, 26] to manipulation [4, 6, 10, 16, 17], in both
inference [1, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 19, 21, 26] and prediction [11, 16–18, 27].
Despite its widespread use, Boltzmann predictions are not always
themost natural. At the core of the Boltzmannmodel is the view that
behavior is a choice among available alternatives; the probability
of any trajectory thus heavily depends on the available alternatives.
This has some unforeseen side-effects. One of the simplest examples
is at the top of Figure 1. Imagine first that there are two possible
ar
X
iv
:2
00
1.
04
46
5v
1 
 [c
s.R
O]
  1
3 J
an
 20
20
trajectories to a goal, left and right, both equally good. Boltzmann
would predict a .5 probability of choosing to go to the left. Next,
imagine that we change the set of alternatives: we add two similar
trajectories to the right. Just because there are more options to
go to the right, Boltzmann now predicts a higher probability that
you will decide to do so: for these four equally good trajectories,
Boltzmann assigns .25 probability each, and estimates going left
with only .25 probability instead of .5 as before. Should this change
in alternatives – the addition of similar options to go to the right –
really be reducing the prediction that you will go left by that much?
This example seems artificial – when are we going to have a) a
group of similar trajectories, and b) an imbalance in the number of
similar trajectories for each option, so that Boltzmann shows this
side-effect? Unfortunately, it is quite representative of real-world
trajectory spaces. Spaces of trajectories are continuous and bounded,
so they naturally contain a continuum of alternatives of varying
similarity to each other, just like the right-side trajectories in our
example. Further, trajectories will have varying amounts of simi-
larity to the rest of the space: just like our left-side trajectory was
dissimilar from the other alternatives, in the real world, trajecto-
ries closer to joint limits or that squeeze in between two nearby
obstacles will be dissimilar from the rest of the trajectory space.
Unfortunately, the Boltzmann model was not designed to han-
dle such spaces. It has its roots in the Luce axiom of choice from
econometrics and mathematical psychology [14, 15], which models
decisions among discrete and different options. When we move to
trajectory spaces, the options now are all connected to some degree:
Our insight is that we need to rethink how to generalize the Luce
axiom to trajectory spaces, and account for how similarity in trajec-
tories should influence their probability.
We take a first step towards this goal by introducing an alterna-
tive to the Boltzmann model that accounts not just for the reward
of each trajectory, but also for the feature-space similarity each
trajectory has with all other alternatives. We name our model LESS,
as it is Limiting Errors due to Similar Selections. We start by testing
that our model does better at predicting human decision (Section 3),
and then move on to analyze its implications for inference. We first
conduct experiments in simulation, with ground truth reward func-
tions, to show that we can make more accurate inferences using our
model (Section 4). Finally, we test inference on real manipulation
tasks with a 7DOF arm, where we learn from user demonstrations
(Section 5)– though we no longer have ground truth, we show that
we can improve the robustness of the inference if we use LESS.
2 METHOD
Motivated by human prediction and reward inference for robotics,
we seek an improved human behavior model, explicitly designed for
trajectory spaces rather than abstract discrete decisions. To develop
this theory, we first turn to the literature on human decisionmaking.
2.1 Background
2.1.1 Human Decision Making. One of the preeminent theories of
human decision making in mathematical psychology is based on
Luce’s axiom of choice [14, 15]. In this formulation, we consider a set
of options O, and we seek to quantify the likelihood that a human
will select any particular option o ∈ O. The desirability of each
option can bemodeled by a functionv : O → R+, wherev produces
higher values formore desirable options. As a consequence of Luce’s
choice axiom, the probability of selecting an option o is given by
P(o) = v(o)∑
o¯∈Ov(o¯)
. (1)
If we further assume that each option o has some underlying reward
R(o) ∈ R, and we allow desirability to be an exponential function
of this reward, then we recover the Luce-Shepard choice rule [20]:
P(o) = e
R(o)∑
o¯∈OeR(o¯)
. (2)
When the options being chosen by the human are trajectories
ξ ∈ Ξ, i.e. sequences of (potentially continuous-valued) actions, we
refer to (2) as the Boltzmann model of noisily-rational behavior
[2, 22]. The reward R is typically a function of a feature vector
ϕ : Ξ→ Rk , giving the probability density p over continuous Ξ as
p(ξ ) = e
R(ϕ(ξ ))∫
Ξ
eR(ϕ(ξ¯ ))d ξ¯
. (3)
2.1.2 Handling duplicates. Since the introduction of the Luce choice
axiom, related works [5, 7] have pointed out its duplicates problem,
where inserting a duplicate of any option o into O has an undue in-
fluence on selection probabilities. To address this drawback, various
extensions of the Luce model have been proposed which attempt to
group together identical or similar options [3, 23]. Further extend-
ing these ideas, Gul et al. [7] recently introduced the attribute rule,
which reinterprets options as bundles of attributes but maintains
Luce’s idea that choice is governed by desirability values.
Analogous to [7], let X be the set of all attributes, let Xo ⊆ X
be the set of attributes belonging to o, and let XO ⊆ X be the set
of attributes which belong to at least one option o ∈ O. Define
an attribute value, w : X → R+, that maps attributes to their
desirability, and an attribute intensity, s : X × O → N, that maps
pairs of attributes and options to natural numbers, usually 0 or 1, to
indicate the degree to which an attribute is expressed. For instance,
an attribute could be the property “green” and s(“green”,o) could
return 1 if option o, say one of a set of cars, is green, and 0 otherwise.
According to the attribute rule, the probability of choosing o is
P(o) =
∑
x ∈Xo
w(x)∑
x¯ ∈XO w(x¯)
· s(x ,o)∑
o¯∈O s(x , o¯)
, (4)
which describes a process where the human first chooses an at-
tribute x ∈ XO according to a Luce-like rule, then an option o ∈ O
with that attribute according to another Luce-like rule. Note that
(4) reduces to (1) if no pair of options in O shares any attributes;
for example, if each o has a single unique attribute, the first sum in
(4) disappears, and the second fraction evaluates to 1. In this work,
we want to take advantage of the attribute rule’s graceful handling
of duplicates while extending its functionality to trajectories with
continuous-valued features and not only categorical attributes.
2.2 The LESS Human Decision Model
In this paper, we take inspiration from the attribute rule to derive a
novel model of human decision making in continuous spaces. Key
to our approach is introducing a similarity measure on trajectories.
This could be directly in the trajectory space, but more generally
it is in feature space, where features could, in one extreme, be the
trajectory itself. We first instantiate the attribute rule with features
as the attributes, and then soften it to account for feature similarity.
Indeed, the Boltzmann rationalitymodel given by (3) already assigns
selection probabilities based only on trajectory features, so we look
to modify the decision space to depend directly on features as well.
2.2.1 Accounting for Trajectories with Identical Features. We derive
our model by starting from (4) and defining the set of attributes to
be Φ, the set of all possible feature vectors. Accordingly, the set of
attributes that belong to ξ is a single element Φξ = {ϕ(ξ )}, and the
attributes represented in a set Ξ′ ⊆ Ξ are ΦΞ′ = {ϕ(ξ ′) | ξ ′ ∈ Ξ′}.
Combining this convention with the reward model (3), the modified
attribute rule for trajectories over a finite subset Ξf ⊂ Ξ becomes
P(ξ ) = e
R(ϕ(ξ ))∑
ϕ¯∈ΦΞf e
R(ϕ¯) ·
s(ϕ(ξ ), ξ )∑
ξ¯ ∈Ξf s(ϕ(ξ ), ξ¯ )
. (5)
In the original attribute rule, the attribute intensity s mapped to the
natural numbers. A convenient mapping in this context would be
to use s as an indicator function, where s(x , ξ ) evaluates to 1 only
if x = ϕ(ξ ). With this formulation, if all trajectories have a unique
feature vector, then the rightmost term of (5) is identically 1 and
we recover the Boltzmann model (3), as applied to a finite sample of
trajectories Ξf . If, on the other hand, multiple trajectories share the
exact same feature vector, then they will effectively be considered
as a single option, and the selection probability will be distributed
equally among them. This effect is desirable: since the features ϕ(ξ )
capture all the relevant inputs to the reward, trajectories with the
same features should be considered practically equivalent.
2.2.2 Softening to Feature Similarity. We suggest that such a notion
of attribute intensity is too stringent for continuous spaces, and we
redefine s to be a soft similarity metric s : Φ×Ξ→ R+, which should
be symmetric (s(ϕ(ξ ), ξ¯ ) = s(ϕ(ξ¯ ), ξ )) and positive semidefinite
(s(x , ξ ) ≥ 0), with s(ϕ(ξ ), ξ ) = maxx ∈Φ, ξ¯ ∈Ξ s(x , ξ¯ ) for all ξ ∈ Ξ.
Using this redefined similarity metric s , we extend (5) to be a
probability density on the continuous trajectory space Ξ, as in (3):
p(ξ ) =
eR(ϕ(ξ ))∫
Ξ
s(ϕ(ξ ), ξ¯ ) d ξ¯∫
Ξ
eR(ϕ(ξˆ ))∫
Ξ
s(ϕ(ξˆ ), ξ¯ ) d ξ¯ d ξˆ
∝ e
R(ϕ(ξ ))∫
Ξ
s(ϕ(ξ ), ξ¯ ) d ξ¯ , (6)
where s(ϕ(ξ ), ξ ) and the integral over ΦΞ are omitted because they
are constant over Ξ and cancel out during normalization.
Under this new formulation, the likelihood of selecting a trajec-
tory is inversely proportional to its feature-space similarity with
other trajectories. This de-weighting of trajectories that are similar
to others is precisely the effect we seek, andwe adopt the probability
given by (6) as our LESS model of human decision making.
2.3 Similarity as Density
The main innovation that differentiates our model from previously
proposed rules is the use of a similarity metric that reweights trajec-
tory likelihoods based on the presence of other trajectories that are
nearby in feature space. We note that the integral of this similarity
over trajectories, the denominator of (6), is akin to a measure of tra-
jectory density in feature space. We estimate similarity as a density
by selecting our similarity metric as a kernel function and perform-
ing Kernel Density Estimation (KDE). There are many choices of
kernel functions, each parametrized by some notion of bandwidth.
In our experiments, we used a radial basis function, which peaks
when x = ϕ(ξ ), then exponentially decreases the farther away x
and ϕ(ξ ) are from one another in feature space:
s(x , ξ ) =
(
1
σ
√
2π
)
exp
(
− ∥x − ϕ(ξ )∥
2
2σ 2
)
, (7)
where the bandwidth σ is an important parameter that dictates,
for a given feature difference between two trajectories, how much
that difference affects the ultimate similarity evaluation. Higher σ
means a higher bandwidth and makes everything look more similar.
We find an optimal bandwidth σ ∗ automatically by using a finite
set of samples Ξf ⊂ Ξ and maximizing the sum of the log of
their summed similarities, which is equivalent to maximizing their
likelihood under a probability density estimate produced by KDE:
σ ∗ = arg max
σ ∈R
∑
ξ ∈Ξf
log
©­­«
∑
ξ¯ ∈Ξf
s(ϕ(ξ ), ξ¯ )ª®®¬ . (8)
2.4 Inference and Prediction with LESS
Let θ ∈ Θ parametrize the reward function R. To predict what the
human will do given a belief b(θ ), we marginalize over θ :
p(ξ ) =
∫
Θ
b(θ )p(ξ |θ )dθ , (9)
withp(ξ |θ ) given by (6). To perform inference over θ given a human
trajectory, we update our belief using Bayesian inference:
b ′(θ ) = b(θ )p(ξ |θ )∫
Θ
b(θ¯ )p(ξ |θ¯ )dθ¯ . (10)
In practice, calculating the integrals in the denominators of (10) and
(6) can be intractable, so we use a discretized set of θ parameters
and finite trajectory sample sets in our experiments. The specific
sampling of the trajectory choice space can significantly impact
inference, and we explore its implications in Section 5.
3 LESS AS A HUMAN DECISION MODEL
We start by testing the hypothesis that LESS is a better model for
human decision making than the standard Boltzmann model.
3.1 Human Decision Model Experiment Design
We design a browser-based user study in which we ask participants
to make behavior decisions, and measure which model best charac-
terizes these decisions. We select a simple navigation task as our
domain, where different behaviors correspond to different ways of
traversing the grid from start to goal, as shown in Figure 2.
3.1.1 Main Design Idea. The key difficulty in designing such a
study is that both models require access to a ground truth reward
function, i.e. user preferences over trajectories. Even though we
can provide participants with some criteria – in our case optimizing
for path length while avoiding the obstacle –, this does not mean
our criteria are the only ones they care about. For instance, people
might implicitly prefer trajectories that go closer to or further from
the obstacle, or that go around the obstacle to the left or right.
(a) Control trial (b) Experimental trial
(c) Distributions for Left and Right (d) Distributions within Right
Figure 2: The human decision model experiment. (a) and (b)
show the trajectories used for the two trials. In (c), LESS pre-
dictions more closely match the observed Left-Right distri-
bution. In (d), both models miss that users demonstrate a
slight preference for R2 (the trajectorywhich visits themost
states in the rightmost column in (b)).
Our design idea is to introduce a control trial in which we gather
data about relative preferences among two dissimilar options: left
and right. These relative preferences then enables us to make pre-
dictions, under each model, about the experimental trial, where we
add trajectories similar to the option on the right.
For the control trial, participants saw the grid world shown in
Figure 2a with one obstacle in the middle and three trajectories
travelling between the start and goal. Two of the trajectories tra-
versed an equal amount of tiles (optimal) and were symmetric along
the diagonal of the grid (left and right), and a third trajectory went
through the obstacle and visited more tiles than the others (not op-
timal). We were only interested in what specific optimal trajectory
people chose (Left versus Right), and we used the third suboptimal
trajectory as an attention test to check if subjects had paid atten-
tion to the instructions. We chose the two optimal trajectories to
be symmetric and of the same color to reduce possible confounds,
such as bias people might have for extraneous features like number
of turns, distance from obstacle, color, etc.
For the experimental trial, shown in Figure 2b, we had the same
setup as in the control, with the addition of two other optimal
trajectories on the right. They had the same color, number of turns,
and number of tiles traversed as the original right-side trajectory. In
this setup, there were two visible clusters of options: one trajectory
on the left, and three clustered on the right, which we denote as
the Left and Right groups, respectively.
3.1.2 Manipulated Variables. We manipulated the model used for
decision-making in the experimental trial to be Boltzmann vs. LESS.
Having access to the ratio λ that participants chose the left trajec-
tory over the right in the control trial means that regardless of their
reward function R(ξ ), eR(ξle f t ) = λeR(ξr iдht ), according to (3). This
enables us to make predictions using both models as a function of
λ for the experimental trial, despite not knowing R itself. For these
computations, we assumed that all trajectories in the Right group
had the same reward, that the reward of trajectories in the Left and
Right groups would be equal to those estimated from the control
trial, and (for LESS) that the Left trajectory had density one while
the Right trajectories had density three.
Under the Boltzmann model, the addition of two trajectories
similar to the one on the right decreases the probability that the
trajectory on the left gets chosen. This is most obvious when λ = 1,
i.e. if users liked both trajectories equally – then, P(ξleft) would go
from .5 all the way down to .25, as there are now 4 good options. On
the other hand, LESS accounts for the similarity of the trajectories
on the right and keeps P(ξleft) closer to the control value.
3.1.3 Dependent Measures. Our measure is the selection propor-
tion of each trajectory in the experimental trial, which enables us to
compute agreement between each model and the users’ decisions.
3.1.4 Subject Allocation. We recruited 80 participants (24 female,
56 male, with ages between 18 and 65) from Amazon Mechanical
Turk (AMT) using the psiTurk experimental framework [8]. We
excluded 3 participants for failing our attention test. All partici-
pants were from the United States and had a minimum approval
rating of 95%. The treatment trial was assigned between-subjects:
participants saw only one of the sets of trajectory options.
3.1.5 Hypotheses.
H1: For the experimental trial, the Boltzmann proportion prediction
is significantly different from the observed proportion.
H2: For the experimental trial, the LESS proportion prediction is
equivalent to the observed proportions.
3.2 Analysis
In the control trial, users chose the Left trajectory 47.5% of the
time. Figure 2 plots the observed proportions for the experimental
trial, along with each model’s predictions. The experimental trial
resulted in an observed probability of .41 for the Left trajectory,
whereas Boltzmann predicts .23 and LESS predicts .475. The models
both predict a uniform distribution among the Right trajectories.
We performed a chi-square test of goodness of fit to see if the
observed distribution of left vs. right from the experimental group
differed from the predicted distributions. In line with our hypothe-
ses, we found a significant difference between the observed values
and the Boltzmann prediction (X 2(1,N = 37) = 6.27, p < 0.05), and
no significant difference between the observations and the LESS
prediction (X 2(1,N = 37) = 0.72, p = 0.4).
To test for equivalence, we performed an equivalence test for
multinomial distributions as described by Wellek [24]. This test
evaluates the null hypothesis that the Euclidean distance between
the multinomial distribution and a reference is greater than some
ϵ (where the distance is computed by taking each distribution to
be a vector in [0, 1]k , where k is the number of trajectories repre-
sented by the distribution). We do not have an a priori estimate for
which values of ϵ are practically insignificant in this vector space
of probability distributions, so we instead invert the test to find
the minimum ϵ for which the observed distribution matches the
predicted distribution at a significance level of α = 0.05. We found
that the minimum ϵ bound for equivalence at the α = 0.05 level was
0.22 for the LESS prediction and 0.39 for the Boltzmann prediction.
The results across all trajectories are analogous, albeit slightly
weaker because users tended to favor one of the three Right tra-
jectories more than the other two. The chi-square test revealed a
significant difference with the Boltzmann predictions, X 2(1,N =
37) = 9.72, p < 0.05, but no significant difference between the ob-
servations and the LESS prediction X 2(1,N = 37) = 5.76, p = 0.12.
The equivalence test found the observed distributionmatches the
LESS-based predicted distribution at a significance level of α = 0.05
when the ϵ bound is 0.29, and 0.36 for Boltzmann. Despite LESS’
tighter ϵ , neither prediction aligns perfectly with the empirical data
in Figure 2d. This discrepancy is likely due to some unmodeled
features (e.g. distance from the obstacle), which may influence
participants’ preferences. However, while unknown features may
affect both Boltzmann’s and LESS’ performance, LESS still corrects
Boltzmann’s errors from mishandling similarity. We explore the
specific effects of feature misspecification further in Section 4.3.
Overall, although neither model is a perfect predictor of behavior,
we find that LESS is a better fit: Boltzmann is significantly different
from the observed, and LESS provides a tighter equivalence bound.
4 USING LESS FOR ROBOT INFERENCE
In Section 3, we provided evidence supporting that LESS can more
accurately capture human decisions. This has direct implications
for how robots predict behavior – increasing the model accuracy
by definition increases the robot’s prediction accuracy. We now
hypothesize that it also has implications for how robots infer human
preferences from behavior: namely, that using a higher accuracy
model when performing inference leads to more accurate inference.
4.1 Boltzmann and LESS inference comparison
We first design an experiment to test that if people do act according
to the LESS distribution, modeling them as such leads to better
inference than modeling them via Boltzmann. To control for poten-
tial confounds, we also verify the opposite: if instead people acted
according to Boltzmann (which Section 3 does not support), then
modeling them as Boltzmann would instead be better for inference.
In this experiment, we created a grid world environment with
two objects, where humans have to teach a robot to navigate from a
start to a goal and learn preferences for whether to stay close or far
from the objects. We simulated hypothetical human demonstrations
ΞD by sampling trajectories according to LESS and Boltzmann. To
do so, we fixed a particular objective θ∗ and a confidence parameter
β , and randomly chose trajectories according to probabilities given
by either (6), for LESS, or (3), for Boltzmann. We then utilized these
trajectories as “human” demonstrations and performed inference
using either Boltzmann or LESS as the underlying choicemodel. Our
goal was to analyze how each model’s inference quality depends
on the sampling model used across a range of objectives θ∗.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
θ
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
P
(θ
∗ )
P(θ∗) averaged across seeds
Boltzmann
LESS
(a) T ruePoster ior metric for LESS sampling model.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
θ
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
P
(θ
∗ )
P(θ∗) averaged across seeds
Boltzmann
LESS
(b) T ruePoster ior metric for Boltzmann sampling model.
Figure 3: TruePosterior results for the inference comparison
experiment in Section 4.1. Legends indicate which inference
method was employed for those results. We found a signifi-
cant interaction effect between sampling method and infer-
ence method, which can be seen in the change of relative
performance for LESS and Boltzmann between (a) and (b).
4.1.1 Manipulated Variables. We used a 2-by-2 factorial design.
We manipulated the sampling model with two levels, Boltzmann
and LESS, as well as the inference model, Boltzmann and LESS.
4.1.2 Other Variables. We tested inference quality across eight
different θ∗ values for more variation and insight. We also used 150
random seeds for sampling demonstrations. For a given sampling
method, the combination of a θ∗ and a seed determine the demon-
stration set that the inference will use. Therefore, we generated
1200 demonstration sets for each sampling method.
4.1.3 Dependent Measures. To analyze each model’s inference
quality, we employ two objective metrics:
Accuracy of a-posteriori inference: once we obtain a posterior prob-
ability induced by the sampled ΞD , we verify that the maximum
a-posteriori θMAP matches the original θ∗. Thus, we define a binary
variable that takes value 1 if they match and 0 otherwise:
TrueMatch = 1{θMAP = θ∗}.
Magnitude of posterior θ∗ probability: this metric provides a soft-
ened, continuous indication of inference performance by capturing
the posterior probability mass assigned to the correct θ∗:
TruePosterior = P(θ∗ | ΞD ).
(a) ΞL and the resulting inferred posterior
(b) ΞB and the resulting inferred posterior
Figure 4: Visualizations of ΞL and ΞB along with the LESS
and Boltzmann inferred posteriors over θ . (a): LESS learns
the correct θ , whereas Boltzmann under-learns. (b): Boltz-
mann learns the correct θ , while LESS is split between avoid-
ing both obstacles vs. avoiding the top one but being ambiva-
lent about the bottom one.
4.1.4 Hypotheses.
H3:When human input is generated using LESS, inference quality
is significantly higher with LESS than with Boltzmann.
H4:When human input is generated using Boltzmann, inference
quality is significantly higher with Boltzmann than with LESS.
4.1.5 Analysis. Figure 3 summarizes the results by showing how
TruePosterior varies by inference method for each of our sampling
methods. To analyze these results, we ran a factorial repeated mea-
sures ANOVA.We found a significant interaction effect between the
sampling and inference methods (F (1, 1199) = 965.06, p < 0.001),
which can be seen with the change in relative performance of Boltz-
mann and LESS from Figure 3a to Figure 3b. A factorial logistic
regression for the TrueMatch results also revealed a significant inter-
action between sampling method and inference method (p < .001).
In post-hoc testing, a Tukey HSD test revealed that TruePosterior
was significantly higher when the inference method matched the
sampling method (p < .001 for both), and logistic regressions simi-
larly showed that the probability of TrueMatch = 1 is greater when
sampling and inference agree (p < .001 for both).
These results strongly support both H3 and H4, as they reveal
that inference performance is superior when the inference method
agrees with the sampling method. Given that the experiment in Sec-
tion 3 suggests that LESS can be a better model of human sampling
behavior, these results provide evidence that using LESS-based in-
ference could give better performance when learning from humans.
4.2 Qualitative analysis of LESS inference
Based on what we have seen thus far, LESS clearly leads to differ-
ent robot inferences. In this section we provide some qualitative
intuition about what contributes to this difference.
Figure 5: Left: actual feature density (gray), adjusted by LESS
(orange). The ΞL points (red) are in dense areas, thus Boltz-
mann inference under-learns. TheΞB points are in sparse ar-
eas, but two of them are in a slightlymore dense area, which
makes Boltzmann reduce their relative influence and ignore
the θ they suggest. Right: 2D density with ΞB , ΞL overlaid.
The important change from Boltzmann to LESS is the strength of
the inference as a function of the feature density at the demonstrated
trajectory. If a demonstrated trajectory lies in a high-density area, i.e.
its features are similar to those of many other possible trajectories,
Boltzmann inference will under-learn. This is because there are
many high-reward alternatives in the normalizer of (3), which
lowers the probability of the demonstration. For the analogous
reason, if a demonstration lies in a low-density area, Boltzmann
inference will over-learn. Because our LESS method weighs each
trajectory ξ by the inverse of the density at its location in feature
space ϕ(ξ ), the resulting weighted density will be approximately
uniform, not allowing the feature density to influence the strength
of the inference: the presence of other options with similar features
does not skew the probability as much anymore.
To visualize this, we chose two sets of demonstrations from the
previous experiment. One set, ΞB , comes from one of the ground
truth rewards for which Boltzmann performed better (θ4 in Figure
3a). The other set, ΞL , comes from one for which LESS performed
better (θ3 in Figure 3b). Figure 4 shows the sampled trajectories
in ΞL and ΞB , along with the inference for each model. For ΞL ,
LESS confidently identifies the ground truth, whereas Boltzmann’s
posterior is higher entropy. Figure 5 shows that ΞL does fall in
a high-density region, which indeed leads to Boltzmann under-
learning and finding many alternative explanations.
For ΞB , on the other hand, something very interesting happens.
Looking at where the samples lie (blue dots in Figure 5), two of them
are in relatively high-density areas (call them ΞdenseB ), whereas
the others are in a very sparse region (call them ΞsparseB ). Ξ
dense
B
are the two with lower ϕ2 in Figure 5 (right). They correspond,
in Figure 4b, to the two trajectories that go closer to the bottom
obstacle. To the LESS inference, which is more agnostic to the
feature density, this gives evidence for two hypotheses: ΞdenseB
support the hypothesis that the robot should stay far from the top
obstacle, but be ambivalent about the bottom one, whereas the other
trajectories, ΞsparseB , support that the robot should stay far from
both obstacles. This is why we see two hypotheses inferred by LESS
in 4b. The Boltzmann inference, however, learns much more from
the trajectories that lie in the low-density area, essentially ignoring
ΞdenseB . This is what leads to the very confident inference of only
one of the hypotheses. In this case, this happens to be the correct
hypothesis. In general though, the opposite could have happened –
had the two trajectories that go closer to the obstacle been the ones
to lie in a sparse area, Boltzmann would have confidently inferred
the wrong objective. In summary, Boltzmann, by being sensitive to
feature densities, can under- or over-learn.
4.3 LESS and feature misspecification
LESS uses information from features to compute similarity, even
when those features do not affect the reward. For example, if the
reward is solely about efficiency, LESS captures that people treat
"right-of-the-obstacle" options as similar. What if the robot does
not have access though to these additional features?
4.3.1 Experimental Design. We again generate demonstrations us-
ing LESS, but we include two additional features: the average x and
average y coordinate of the trajectory. The two new features do not
influence the trajectories’ reward values, but they do influence the
similarity metric. To induce a misspecification, the robot perform-
ing inference is unaware of these new features. For this experiment,
we only manipulate the inference model: LESS vs. Boltzmann.
H5:When the robot’s feature space is misspecified, inference qual-
ity with LESS is still superior to inference quality with Boltzmann
for LESS-sampled demonstrations.
4.3.2 Analysis. For TruePosterior , we performed a one-way re-
peated measures ANOVA, and as hypothesized, the test revealed
that LESS inference was still significantly better than Boltzmann,
in spite of the feature misspecification (p < .001). Similarly for
TrueMatch, a logistic regression revealed that the odds of hav-
ing TrueMatch = 1 were significantly greater when using LESS
(p < .001), strongly supporting our hypothesis.
We take this result with a grain of salt: in the worst case, if an
unspecified feature completely differentiates all options for the
human, then even a human sampling according to LESS would
exhibit behavior approaching the Boltzmann distribution. Then,
based on Section 4.1, Boltzmann inference could yield superior
results. However, this experiment suggest that in practical rather
than adversarial cases, it is still preferable to use LESS inference
on an incomplete set of features. Further, it is always possible
to default in LESS to using the trajectory space directly for the
similarity metric s and not rely on features.
5 ROBUST INFERENCE FOR HIGH-DOF ARMS
Section 4 teased that Boltzmann inference performance is highly
dependent on the structure of the environment, and, more precisely,
the feature space density induced by all possible trajectories. How-
ever, we demonstrated this on a toy task with simulated human
data and ground truth access. We now put the same hypothesis to
test in a real world high-dimensional scenario with a 7DoF robotic
manipulator and real human demonstrations, where one cannot
have access to the full trajectory space, nor the ground truth reward.
5.1 Single demonstration inference
5.1.1 Study Goal. Since for such an environment calculating the
denominator in (3) exactly is intractable, practitioners typically
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Figure 6: Results for the laptop task in the robustness analy-
sis experiments. In (a), LESS significantly outperformsBoltz-
mann at low sample sizes, but they converge for the largest
sample sizes. For the batch inference task in (b), Boltzmann
outperforms LESS at the lowest sample size, but the two
methods converge towards zero as sample size increase.
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Figure 7: Single-demonstration (blue) inference posteriors
for the table task with two different trajectory sets of 100
samples. The distributions reveal that both Boltzmann and
LESS produce the same θMAP, but there is less variability be-
tween the LESS posteriors, leading to lower KLAggregate.
sample the space of trajectories, obtaining varying subsets. Given
the Boltzmann model’s high dependency on the feature space den-
sity, we speculate that different sample sets would result in vastly
varying inference results. In this section, we investigate how LESS
can mitigate this effect and help inference robustness. We collect
demonstrations from participants for different tasks, and run infer-
ence using different sets of trajectory for computing the normalizer.
5.1.2 Manipulated Variables. We used a 2-by-5 factorial design.
We manipulated the inference model with two levels, Boltzmann
and LESS, as well as the size S of the sampled trajectory sets used
for inference, with five levels: 10, 30, 100, 300, and 1000. We sample
10 different trajectory sets of each size.
5.1.3 Other Variables. We tested our hypothesis across three house-
hold manipulation tasks where the robot learned to carry a coffee
mug from a start position to a goal according to the person’s pref-
erences. In the first task, which we dub table, the participants were
asked to move the robot arm from start to goal while maintaining
the end-effector close to the table, to prevent the mug from breaking
in case of a slip. In the second task, dubbed laptop, the participants
were instructed to avoid spilling the coffee over a laptop by pro-
viding a demonstration that keeps the robot’s end-effector away
from the electronic device. Lastly, in the third task, dubbed human
we asked the participants to keep the end-effector away from their
body, to avoid spilling coffee on their clothes.
In all scenarios, the robot performs inference by reasoning over
three features: one feature of interest (distance from the table, dis-
tance from the laptop, and distance from the human, respectively),
a second feature drawn from that set, and an efficiency feature
computed as the sum of squared velocities across the trajectory.
5.1.4 Dependent Measures. In total, for each task T , sample size
S , inference method M , and user i , we obtained 10 posterior dis-
tributions PT ,iM,S (θˆ | ξT ,i ) constituting a set PT ,iM,S . Our goal was
to test how robust (or consistent) each method’s inference result
was across the ten different trajectory sets. We used an aggregate
Kullback-Leibler divergence as a measure of how much the poste-
rior distributions P ∈ PT ,iM,S differ from one another:
KLAддreдate = −
∑
P ∈PT ,iM,S
∑
Q ∈PT ,iM,S
∑
θˆ ∈Θ
P(θˆ | ξT ,i ) log
(
Q(θˆ | ξT ,i )
P(θˆ | ξT ,i )
)
.
5.1.5 Hypothesis.
H6: Performing single inference with LESS across multiple trajec-
tory sets results in higher robustness and, thus, a lowerKLAggregate
measure than inference with Boltzmann.
5.1.6 Subject Allocation. We recruited 12 users (3 female, 9 male,
aged 18-30) from the campus community to physically interact with
a JACO 7DOF robotic arm and provide demonstrations for three
tasks. Figure 7 (left) illustrates the demonstrations collected for
the table task. Before giving any demonstrations, each person was
allowed a period of training with the robot in gravity compensation
mode, in order to get accustomed to interacting with the robot.
5.1.7 Analysis. As seen in Figure 7, given two different trajectory
sets, inference with each method can have drastically different
outcomes. With LESS (top), we see that the resulting posterior
distributions are fairly similar, whereas with Boltzmann inference
(bottom), they differ in entropy/confidence.
For each sample taskT , we performed a factorial repeated-measures
ANOVA. The results for the laptop task are summarized in Fig-
ure 6a. As the trend in the figure indicates, we found a signifi-
cant interaction effect between inference method and sample size
(F (4, 44) = 40.37, p < .001). A post-hoc Tukey HSD test revealed
that LESS produced significantly lower KLAggregate than Boltz-
mann for S = 10, 30, and 100 (p < 0.001 for all), but there was no
significant difference found for S = 300 or 1000 (p ≈ 1.00 for both).
This trend supports our hypothesis that LESS provides more robust
single-demonstration inference, and it reveals that the difference
in KLAggregate between LESS and Boltzmann disappears with in-
creasing sample size. Results from the table task also support this
trend, with a significant main effect of inference method.
While the human task did reveal a significant interaction between
inference method and sample size (F (4, 44) = 2.85,p < .05) it stands
apart from the other two: a post-hoc Tukey HSD test only found a
difference for sample size 1000 (p < .001). This pattern indicates that
demonstrations from this task may be generally more ambiguous
and present a more difficult inference problem than the other two.
5.2 All demonstrations inference
We repeated the same experiment, except this time we run inference
by aggregating all users’ demonstrations for a task (batch inference).
This would happen in practice if we were interested in teaching the
robot about what the average user wants, rather than focusing on
customizing the behavior to each user. Here, we found the opposite
results, also shown in in Figure 6b: LESS has higher divergence
(lower robustness). We attribute this to the phenomenon described
in Section 4.2. When we had only one demonstration before, Boltz-
mann was not robust because, depending on the set of samples,
the demonstration could fall in low- or high-density regions, thus
leading to different Boltzmann inferences for different sets. Now,
with 12 demonstrations at once, the chances of one demonstration
falling in a low-density area are much higher. As we’ve seen in
Section 4.2, when there are multiple demonstrations, Boltzmann
inference will be dominated by those lying in low-density areas.
This leads to a more consistent posterior distribution, so long as
the low-density demonstrations suggest the same reward function.
6 DISCUSSION
We propose a new probabilistic human behavior model and present
compelling evidence that it better captures human decision making
and it attenuates inference errors that arise due to similar selections,
increasing accuracy and robustness.
One limitation of our method is its reliance on a pre-specified
set of robot features for similarity selection, which makes feature
misspecification a possible limitation. Although our experiments
in Section 4.3 reveal that LESS still performs better inference than
Boltzmann, it is unclear whether this outcome is due to the effect
of hypothesis H3 or if our method is truly unaffected by misspecifi-
cation. Further experiments are needed for complete clarification.
Our 12-person aggregate inference results in Section 5 show that
LESS can lead to less robust inference.We attributed this outcome to
the phenomenon in Section 4.2, but it remains unclear whether this
leads to less accurate inference, or whether Boltzmann is actually
preferable in situations with enough varied demonstrations.
Lastly, the Mechanical Turk study in Section 3, although com-
pelling, illustrates simplistic datasets of human choices. Further
studies on human behavior in more realistic settings would be use-
ful, but complicated by lack of access to the "ground truth" reward.
Despite these limitations, Boltzmann rationality has become
so fundamental to how robots do inference and prediction, that
designing a counterpart for continuous robotics domains is sorely
needed. We are excited to have taken a step in this direction.
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